Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

M
any tax economists, lawyers, and accountants have examined the design of mechanisms with which financial services can be appropriately taxed under a broad-based consumption tax such as a value added tax (VAT). The main problem identified in the application of a VAT to financial services is that of calculating the value added when such services are not explicitly priced, and allocating it between the two sides of the transaction (e.g., between savers and the dissavers). Recent papers that address these issues include English and Poddar (1997) , Bradford (1996) , Merrill and Edwards (1996) , and, in the context of developing countries, Gillis (1990) . Most authors take as given the desirability of taxing financial services, and confine themselves to implementation issues. The aim of this paper is to show that the focus of the literature so far has been somewhat misguided. Chia and Whalley (1989) and Whalley (1992) have taken a step back from the implementation issue and asked whether banks should be taxed. They argue that, under the assumption that financial services do not enter individuals' utility functions directly, they should not be included in the base of a consumption tax. Grubert and Mackie (1999) adopt the same reasoning in arguing that financial services should not be taxed under a consumption tax, and Quiggin (1993) mentions a similar point briefly in passing. The analysis of this note is
The Treatment of Financial Services under a Broad-Based Consumption Tax consistent with those papers. However, the observation that financial services do not provide direct consumption benefits, while useful, is not sufficient to yield the prescription of exemption (or, more precisely, zero rating). The same could be said for other inputs into the production of final goods, such as unfinished plastic, steel, or cement-these intermediary goods yield no direct consumption benefit (for most people) but are properly included in the base of a broad-based VAT. I assume that the underlying feature of a consumption tax that we wish to maintain is that it has no direct effect on the relative prices of different non-leisure consumption goods.
1,2 By consumption goods, I mean goods that effectively provide direct benefits to individuals-in a formal sense, those that the economist would model as entering an individual's utility function directly. As I concentrate on financial services, of particular interest are goods consumed at different dates and in different states of the world. This will allow examination of the treatment of financial services in the banking/investment area, and the insurance sector.
The simple observation of the current paper is that if the value added from financial services provided to final consumers is proportional to the nominal value of the underlying financial transfer-e.g., if a bank charges for financial services by means of an interest rate spread-then it should not be taxed. On the other hand, to the extent that the fixed fee charged for financial intermediation services is proportional to the real value of the underlying transfer, it should be included in the VAT base. I refer to such charges as quasifixed fees. 3 These rules ensure that the relative prices of consumption goods are not directly affected by the tax. In the case of spread-based charges, the finance charge automatically increases proportionately in response to a tax on final consumption, so taxing it would distort relative consumption good prices. On the other hand, quasi-fixed fees do not automatically increase in proportion to the tax, so should be included in the base. Thus the services that the literature has identified as being difficult to tax are exactly those which in fact should not be taxed.
The prospect of such a free lunch is seductive, although the treatment of business use of financial services may introduce some complexity. It is orthodox to assume that, since a VAT has no impact on net input costs, the treatment of business users of financial services is simpler than that of final consumers. For example, Merrill and Edwards (1996) note that "[b]y contrast, the failure to tax implicit FI [financial intermediation] fees supplied to business customers typically will be offset by the lack of a deduction at the customer level." However, if firms cannot easily use (future) input tax credits to offset current input tax liabilities, financing costs, including financial intermediation costs, could increase as a result of the tax. I parameterize the extent to which such an offset is possible, and use this to calculate the size of a phantom tax credit businesses should be given in order to indeed ensure that total input costs (including the costs of financial services) are unaffected 1 Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) show that such a condition characterizes an optimal tax system when preferences satisfy a weak separability condition, although the optimal tax on labour income is likely to be non-linear. 2 Even if a tax has no direct effect on relative prices, in the presence of wealth effects, the general equilibrium impact may induce relative price changes. In the absence of other distortionary taxes, such adjustments do not represent distortions. 3 I thank a referee for pointing out that banks and other financial intermediaries can substitute one kind of charge for another, for example by bundling ATM transactions with checking account services, or by offering higher interest rates on larger deposits. Taxing the different charges differently could induce some adjustment in the kinds of fees charged, which might have efficiency costs on the supply side. This paper is concerned primarily with demand side efficiency issues.
by the tax. It may be that we need tax accountants after all, to examine ways of implementing this aspect of financial service taxation, instead of targeting services provided to final consumers. The next section presents a simple numerical example of financial services provided to final consumers. This is followed by a formal, although equally simple, algebraic treatment in the third section of banking and insurance, again at the final consumer level. The fourth section examines the issue of business users, and the fifth section briefly considers the treatment of financial services under alternative consumption tax proposals. Finally, the sixth section concludes.
SOME NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
Consider a simple banking example in which an individual allocates consumption across time. There are two periods and one good, the nominal price of which does not change over time and is normalized to $1. Suppose an individual is contemplating giving up a unit of consumption in period 1. This requires that they save $1. If the market rate of interest is 10 percent, they earn $1.10, and can purchase 1.1 units of the good in the second period. The relative price of the good in the second period with respect to that in the first is 1/1.1 =10/11 ≈ .91. Now suppose that the consumer saves with a bank, and that the bank earns interest of 20 percent on its loans to other clients. Let us also assume that the demand for bank loans is infinitely elastic at this rate, so that the saver bears the full cost of the interest rate spread of 10 percentage points. In the absence of intermediation costs, the saver would receive the full interest rate of 20 percent. 4 Under the assumption that the individual chooses to transfer consumption from period 1 to period 2 using the bank, the intermediation services are properly seen as being an input into the production of future consumption. A typical credit-invoice VAT would thus call for these services, although not inherently valued, to be taxed like any other input.
However, suppose a 50 percent VAT is now introduced. Consider first the case in which VAT is applied to the financial service component of the bank's operations. In this case, foregoing a unit of real consumption in period 1 permits the individual to save $1.50. Assuming that interest rates don't change, they earn 10 percent on this deposit, so they arrive at period 2 with $1.65. The amount they effectively pay as a financial service charge is $.15, and, if they are required to pay VAT on this amount, their net return in period 2 is $1.65 -$.075 = $1.575. These funds can be used to purchase 1.575/1.50 = 1. 05 units of the good. The relative price of the good in the second period with respect to that in the first is thus 1/1.05 ≈ .95. That is, second period consumption is relatively more expensive than in the absence of the VAT.
If the financial service is not taxable, then the individual's net return is $1.65, which buys 1.65/1.50 = 1. 1 units of second period consumption. The relative price of consumption in the second period vis-à-vis that in the first is thus .91-equal to that in the absence of the VAT. Now suppose that instead of charging for the financial service by means of an interest rate spread, the bank charges a pure fixed fee of $.15. That is, depositors earn interest of 20 percent, but pay the fixed fee to cover administrative costs. It is important to recognize that this fee structure is a form of non-linear pricing, and to recall that the efficiency properties of resource allocations are determined by prices paid at the margin. In the absence of a VAT, the average price of the first unit of period 2 consumption remains unaf-fected (since, in this example, the size of the intermediation fee has not changed). However, the marginal price of second period consumption is 1/1.2 ≈ .83.
A VAT is now introduced at a rate of 50 percent. Conditional on saving a positive amount, the individual again saves $1.50 when they forego an additional unit of consumption in the first period. They earn a return at the margin of $1.80, yielding a relative price of period 2 consumption equal to 1.5/1.8 ≈ .83, the same as without the VAT. Here, it is irrelevant whether the financial service is subject to VAT, as, conditional on saving a positive amount, the tax is effectively lump-sum. The only potential behavioral effect of a tax on the pure fixed fee is via the income effectan individual who was previously saving a small amount may now be deterred from doing so.
An alternative type of fixed fee, which I shall refer to as a quasi-fixed fee, is one associated with banking services that do not facilitate inter-termporal substitution of consumption, but which reduce the cost of current consumption. Examples include the use of automatic teller machines (ATMs) which allow consumers to economize on cash holdings, automatic debit cards (which serve a similar purpose) and credit cards whose balance is paid off before interest charges start to accrue. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that an individual's use of such services is proportional to the number of transactions undertaken, and hence to the quantity of real consumption goods purchased in a period. Now it is necessary to tax the financial service whose value added is represented by the quasi-fixed fee.
To see this, suppose there are two consumption goods. The first can be purchased directly, and the second requires the use of a unit of banking services for each unit of the good purchased. Suppose the price of the first good is $1, that of the second is $2, and that the fixed fee per transaction is $.50. The relative price of the second good vis-a-vis the first is 2.5. Now a VAT is introduced at a rate of 50 percent. If the fixed financial service fee is untaxed, the relative price of the second good becomes 3.5/1.5 ≈ 2.3. On the other hand, subjecting the financial service to VAT yields a relative price of 3.75/1.5 = 2.5.
These numerical examples suggest that the tax rules for the three kinds of financial service charges-spreads, pure fixed fees, and quasi-fixed fees-should differ. To maintain undistorted relative consumption goods prices, quasi-fixed fees must be taxed. On the other hand, to achieve the same objective, spreads should not be taxed. Finally, the tax treatment of pure fixed fees has little if any efficiency effect. The next section provides a formal exposition of these results.
SIMPLE MODELS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
In this section I present two formal models of financial service provision. The first examines the case of banking services, which generally facilitate trades across time. The second model is of the costly provision of insurance, which facilitates the allocation of consumption across alternative states of the world under conditions of uncertainty. Both models focus on the use of financial services by final consumers.
Banking Costless banking
Consider a two-period model with consumption in period i denoted c i , i =1, 2. An individual has preferences over bundles of these goods, as described by a utility function u(c 1 ,c 2 ). In the absence of any financial services, the purchase price of good i is p i (which includes any search costs the individual might incur). The consumer has exogenous income w in period 1 , and income in period 2 is zero (this en-sures that the individual is a net saver, for simplicity). If the individual can deposit funds with a bank and earn interest at a rate r, their budget constraint their is:
assuming that the bank levies no charges against them.
Costly banking
Now suppose that the transformation of first period consumption into second period consumption requires the use of costly banking inputs, i.e., financial services. These inputs do not enter the individual's utility function directly-all they care about are the quantities c 1 and c 2 that they consume. Writing down the cost function of a financial intermediary is not an easy task. I will identify three potential types of costs, and investigate the consequences of each for design of a consumption tax base.
First, it is likely that there will be certain fixed cost components associated with banking services, such as account opening and maintenance costs, regulatory compliance costs, etc.
Second, in addition to facilitating intertemporal trade, banking services include a convenience component, allowing individuals to economize on cash holdings, make payments automatically, etc. We can think of these services as reducing the grossprice of consumption at date i from p i to p′ i = p i -α i , for some α i > 0. It is reasonable to expect that the costs of these services are proportional to the volume of transactions recorded, but not their nominal value. For want of a better term, I shall refer to these as quasi-fixed costs.
Finally, some costs of facilitating intertemporal trade are likely to be proportional to the nominal value of the intertemporal transfer. There are at least two reasons to expect such costs. First, suppose some proportion, say σ, of a bank's loan portfolio is expected not to perform. The net resources available to the bank to repay depositors is then (approximately) equal to deposits times one plus the loan interest rate minus the share of non-performing loans. Assuming this share is constant (there is no adverse selection in the loan market), the larger the deposited funds, the larger the cost represented by defaults. Alternatively, a bank may rationally spend more resources monitoring and supervising larger loans, or marketing to larger depositors.
Different financial instruments will clearly have different cost structures. Thus, a government bond broker will likely incur fixed costs, but does not usually provide the convenience services identified above. Nor would he be expected to guard against default (since the government's assets consist of relatively safe future tax liabilities), so would not be exposed to high proportional costs.
On the other hand, a traditional bank is likely to encounter a mix of fixed, quasifixed, and proportional costs, and it is to be expected that consumers will wish to allocate their savings across financial instruments according to the valuations of the different services.
Let us assume that providers of financial services are competitive and earn zero profits, and that they can charge consumers on the basis of incurred costs. Three types of fees can be expected: 5 (i) a fixed fee F, like annual credit card fees, account opening fees, etc.; (ii) a quasi-fixed fee φ, such as transactions fees (ATM charges), check writing fees, etc., which is levied in proportion to the volume of real consumption; and
(iii) a proportional fee, equal to s times the nominal value of funds deposited. σ is identified as the spread between the borrowing and lending rates.
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These charges, F, φ, and σ, may differ across financial institutions depending on their internal efficiency and the services they provide. Given (F, φ, σ), an individual's inter-temporal budget constraint becomes: Applying a VAT If a VAT is introduced at a rate τ , and is applied only to the purchase price of goods 1 and 2, then [1] becomes: [2] and the relative price is:
as p′ 2 >p′ 1 . Applying the tax to both the purchase price and the quasi-fixed fee, however, yields a relative price of:
Applying the tax to the spread component of the charge as well yields a relative price of:
while applying it to the pure fixed fee has no effect on the relative price of good 2 (at the margin), since the budget constrain reduces to: [3] Under the assumption that the individual always chooses a positive quantity of each good (i.e., assuming that u 1 (0, c 2 ) = u 2 (c 1 , 0) = ∞), δ =1, and levying the tax on the pure fixed fee has a pure income effect.
Insurance
Suppose an individual faces uncertainty about the state of the world (say about the occurrence of an accident or the onset of ill health). Corresponding to the simple framework of the banking model
6 Recall our assumption that the demand for loans is infinitely elastic at the loan interest rate.
above, we assume there are two possible states of the world i =1, 2, and consumption in state i is c i . Let the endowment of consumption in each state be c i , with c 1 > c 2 , so that state 2 is the accident state. The probability of an accident is π, and the probability of state 1 occurring is (1 -π). Insurance companies offer contracts that consist of a premium, P, paid by consumers in both states of the world, and a benefit, B, paid by the insurer in state 2. Clearly we have:
and:
Costless insurance
If insurance companies are competitive and use no resources in spreading risk among individuals, and if all individuals face the same probability, then expected profits are zero, and the premium just covers the expected benefit:
Thus, in terms of consumption in different states, an individual's budget constraint is:
(1 -π)∆c 1 + π∆c 2 = 0 or:
(1 -π)c 1 + πc 2 = w where w = (1 -π)c 1 + πc 2 is the individual's effective income. The relative price of consumption in state 2 with respect to consumption in state 1 is thus π/ (1 -π).
Costly insurance
Now suppose that the insurance company incurs a cost that is proportional to the nominal value of outstanding policies. Such a cost may derive from the exposure the company faces to systemic risk that cannot be offset through the reinsurance market. The cost can be recovered by adding a loading factor to the premium, say in a proportion λ . 7 The premium charged, then, must cover the expected value of benefits paid, plus costs, and becomes:
For a given benefit level B, consumption in the second state of the world is:
and consumption in state 1 is:
Thus, the individual's budget constraint is:
where w(λ) = (1 + λ)πc 2 + (1 -(1 + λ)π)c 1 . The relative price of state 2 consumption in terms of state 1 consumption is thus:
Applying a VAT Introducing a VAT at rate τ to consumption in each state, c i , and to the load factor, yields a relative price of state 2 consumption of: 7 We do not include the possibility of pure or quasi-fixed fees in this insurance example. Pure fixed fees have no efficiency implications for the tax base. Services that facilitate consumption in both states of the world (like credit cards in the banking example) and would be financed with quasi-fixed fees, would appear to be unusual in the insurance sector.
[
On the other hand, applying the VAT only to consumption in each state maintains the relative price at its level in the absence of the tax, p 0 ins .
TAX TREATMENT OF BUSINESS USERS
We have only considered transactions between financial institutions and final consumers. What about the treatment of business use of such services? As before, our guiding principle is that of maintaining the relative prices of final consumption goods. I will consider two alternative uses of banking services by business: working capital uses and investment loans-i.e., loans for the purchase of capital assets. The distinction derives from an assumption that the price effects of a VAT differ across recurrent inputs and capital assets, the tax-inclusive price of the former rising relative to the latter. A common assumption is that the price of recurrent inputs increases by the amount of the tax, while the price of capital assets remains unchanged.
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Working capital loans
The tax treatment of financial services used by businesses is non-trivial only if the tax alters the volume of services used. In the model of consumer loans, the volume of borrowing increased with the tax because the purchase price of the consumption good increased in proportion to the tax. Identifying working capital loans as those used to finance recurrent inputs, the appropriate treatment turns on whether firms' financing costs increase with the tax. Of course, the net cost of inputs under a credit-invoice VAT is unaffected by the tax-any price increase due to tax payable on input purchases is offset by subsequent credits against future sales. If firms could costlessly borrow against future credits, and hence pay just the net-of-tax price for inputs, then financial services used by businesses would not need to be brought in to the tax net. However, the whole point of this discussion is that such transfers are costly. On the other hand, in a steady state of a dynamic model, when a firm is contemporaneously paying input taxes and receiving credits for tax paid on previous purchases, its working capital requirements might be better assumed to be related to the net input price, which is unaltered by the tax. However, firms will typically use financial intermediaries to manage contemporaneous cash flows, so there will likely be some cost associated with netting out the tax effects.
To see the effect of the tax, consider a simple example in which a firm uses labor, l, and one other input, y, to produce a good c 1 . The production function is Leontief, and a unit of output requires l 1 units of labor and y 1 units of the other input. To abstract from issues of intertemporal choice, let us simply assume that the firm must use a second institutionthe financial intermediary-to purchase the input y. For example, if the market for y has search costs, the intermediary might undertake such search activities. Assume also that the fee charged by the intermediary for this search service is proportional to the price p y paid for the input. If the proportion is λ, then the cost of producing a unit of c 1 is:
We can think of the firm incurring costs made up of labor costs wl 1 , direct input costs p y y 1 , and search costs λ p y y 1 . In a competitive market, the total unit cost γ (w, p y , λ) is equal to the price charged to final consumers, p 1 . A second consumption good is produced by a firm using only labor, with unit cost p 2 = wl 2 , where l 2 is the unit labor input requirement.
Suppose a tax on final consumption of c 1 and c 2 is introduced at the rate τ, payable at the retail level. The relative price of good 2 with respect to good 1 is clearly unaffected. Now suppose this tax is implemented as a credit-invoice style VAT, with tax paid on purchases of the input y creditable. Let me introduce the parameter α ∈[0, 1] to measure the extent to which firms can use (future or current) input credits to offset (current) input taxes. That is, the intermediation costs of purchasing inputs y 1 are λp y y 1 (1 + ατ), so that if α = 1, the firm is unable to use the credits and must borrow enough to pay the full tax-inclusive input price. On the other hand, when α = 0, working capital requirements are unaffected by the tax. The relative price of good 2 with respect to good 1 is thus:
For α = 0, zero-rating the intermediation services maintains the relative prices of goods 1 and 2: if working capital requirements are unaffected by the tax because the firm can costlessly use tax credits to offset input tax liabilities, the treatment of business use of financial services is the same as that of consumer loans. However, whenever α > 0, even zero-rating the intermediation service increases the relative price of good 1 . This distortion can only be removed by allowing the firm a (phantom) credit against the increase in intermediation fee caused by the introduction of the tax, αλτp y y 1 . Such a credit reduces tax revenue, which is transferred to the provider of the intermediation service, but is required to maintain relative consumption goods prices.
From a practical point of view, it is probably better to err on the side of simplicity and to assume α = 0 in the analysis above, especially in light of the preceding footnote. This is particularly prudent when we consider the treatment of business use of investment loans (see the next sub-section). As in the final consumption case of section 3, the treatment of quasifixed fees is standard. Firms should be taxed on their use of them, and receive credits at the next stage. Similarly, the treatment of pure fixed fees is of little importance as far as efficiency effects are concerned.
Investment loans
Suppose now that a business uses a bank loan to finance the purchase of physical (or other) capital, the price of which does not increase with the introduction of the tax. Because the capital asset purchase does not require a larger loan, there is no proportional increase in the banking fee, so no need to give the business an offsetting credit. The tax treatment of financial services associated with investment loans is then simply to ignore them completely. Coupled with the practical assumption that businesses can easily use tax credits to finance contemporaneous tax liabilities (α = 0 above), this argues for the exemption of all business level financial services from the tax base.
p 1 + αλτp y y 1 < p 2 . p 2 p 1 9 A referee has pointed out that in France and the UK the VAT resulted in an overall cash-flow benefit for most industries, as firms' financing constraints were weakened by access to the "float"-the time between collection and payment of output VAT net of the time between payment and credit of input VAT. In such a case, α would be negative.
base the financial service fee F must be explicitly calculated in period 2, while this is not necessary under "R + F".
CONCLUSION
There has been much discussion in the literature regarding feasible mechanisms for taxing financial services under a broad-based consumption tax. Commentators regularly claim that the treatment of business users presents little conceptual difficulty, but that final consumers of financial services provide the tax man with headaches. This paper has claimed that, on the contrary, the treatment of financial services used by final consumers is relatively straightforward-fixed fees, which tend to be easily identifiable, should be taxable, and implicit fees covered by spreads, which are difficult to observe and apportion, should be zero-rated. The treatment of business users of implicitlypriced financial services depends on the extent to which working capital requirements are affected by the introduction of the tax. As a practical matter, it seems prudent to assume the tax has little systematic effect on such requirements, and to treat business users in the same way as final consumers.
